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D/ORPA-78-1369
2 November 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer, Special Studies

FROM : [REDACTED]
Director, Regional & Political Analysis

SUBJECT : DCI Annual Report

Attached is the relevant portions of the NFAC response to the analytical portions of the 14 January 1978 Brzezinski letter to the DCI on political intelligence and analysis. This addresses the first tick under paragraph 6 on page 3 of [REDACTED] letter to Mr. Bowie of 11 October. In addition there is a longer attachment (also included) by Mr. Bowie that accompanied the response to Brzezinski.

Attachment:
As stated

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improve both the capabilities of our analysts and the milieu in which they work. These are necessarily long lead-time undertakings from which payoffs can be expected only gradually. Among our most important initiatives is our increased emphasis on interdisciplinary approaches to problems. Our principal goal in this respect is not so much to develop new organizational forms as to stimulate the development of broad-gauged individual analytical talent capable of performing high quality integrative analysis. usc

Another program that we hope will enhance our analytical capabilities is the establishment in FY 78-79 of about a dozen new overseas positions for NFAC analysts. Our people would serve in the missions for two years, but would act as field analysts rather than as collectors. We hope also to be able to send some analysts abroad this year to study.

We intend to strengthen the pre-publication review of key analyses both by improving our internal procedures and by submitting them to outside consultants with relevant background. We have done this several times recently. We have a large number of additional candidate reviewers; our task at the moment is to pare the list and complete administrative procedures to bring them on.

We have given considerable attention to the identification and recruitment of established analysts for lateral entry into our ranks. We have had some success here, and NFAC has recently hired 15 to 20 first-rate analysts from among senior DDO officers with extensive experience abroad. We have had little success in attracting officers from other departments, such as State, Treasury, etc. They do not see a rotational tour at CIA as contributing to their career growth in their home bureaucracies.

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We continue to try to alter our incentives and rewards to encourage analysts to produce more venturesome analyses. But there are an increasing number of requests for immediate support in the form of briefings, typescript memoranda, graphics, etc. These projects are highly labor intensive, but have the attraction of immediate feedback from the recipients. Production office managers and analysts have strong incentives to give such work the highest priority. In particular, analysts are reluctant to forego the excitement and rewards associated with shorter term work in favor of deferred praise for projects that take more time to complete. The policy community tends by its demands and responses to reinforce the short-term focus.

One way to cope with this latter problem is to isolate more first-rate analysts from the daily fray. On key areas, however, we do this at our peril since we often do not have enough analyst depth to ensure strong output of both kinds. Not surprisingly, our best in-depth analysts tend also to be best at firefighting. We hope to ease this problem by adding analysts to the corps in both FY 79 and FY 80. And we should be able to enhance our analytical strength by more frequent resort to carefully managed contractors who can concentrate on single important problems without the daily distractions that our analysts face.

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